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THE TROUBLED BEGINNING OF THE
INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT
JAMES W. ELY, JR.*
From the time of their origin, railroads had been subject to
regulation by the states. By the 1880s, however, there was broad
agreement that piecemeal and inconsistent state controls were
inadequate to deal with perceived difficulties and abuses arising from
the interstate operations of railroads. Yet there was little agreement
about the nature of the “railway problem,” and still less any consensus
as to how best to address the issue. Translating the amorphous public
wish for rail regulation into concrete legislation was not an easy task.
After years of inconclusive debate, Congress passed the Interstate
1
Commerce Act in 1887. Despite this important step, the early years
reveal an Act that made little difference. Congress itself waited nearly
two decades to strengthen the powers granted to the Interstate
Commerce Commission (“Commission” or “ICC”).
An untidy compromise between quite different House and Senate
bills, the Interstate Commerce Act was an amalgam of diverse and
2
vague provisions. It created the ICC, the first important federal
3
administrative agency, to oversee the Act. The five-member ICC had
the authority to conduct hearings and issue orders to stop practices in
4
violation of the statute. The Act declared that charges for interstate rail
5
transportation should be “reasonable and just,” but did not define this
term or give the ICC the power to set rates. In addition, the Act banned
rebates or preferential treatment for any shipper, and outlawed the
6
pooling of traffic or earnings among carriers. The Act left unresolved a
basic question: Was it intended to encourage competition among the
carriers, or to stabilize the industry through cartelization? As with any
* Milton R. Underwood Professor of Law, Emeritus, and Professor of History,
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1. Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887). See generally ARI HOOGENBOOM & OLIVE
HOOGENBOOM, A HISTORY OF THE ICC: FROM PANACAEA TO PALLIATIVE 13–18 (1976).
2. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW 90–93 (2001).
3. Interstate Commerce Act § 11, 24 Stat. at 383.
4. Id. §§ 12, 15, 24 Stat. at 383, 384.
5. Id. § 1, 24 Stat. at 379.
6. Id. §§ 2–3, 5, 24 Stat. at 379–80.
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novel measure, the effectiveness of the Act was open to question.
Congress seemed primarily concerned to placate the public clamor to
curb alleged railroad abuses, and was happy to leave unsettled policy
issues to the ICC and the courts. “The entry of the national government
into the realm of railroad regulation,” historian Morton Keller aptly
7
explained, “was a leap in the dark.”
The early years of the ICC present a tale of frustration. The sheer
size and complexity of the rail industry presented daunting challenges to
the fledgling agency with its small staff. Moreover, the states retained
jurisdiction over intrastate transportation, and state regulation had the
potential to undermine ICC policy. The skepticism of the federal courts
about administrative regulation of the economy also greatly contributed
to the feeble nature of ICC supervision. Both the Supreme Court and
the lower federal courts consistently placed a narrow construction on
the Commission’s authority.
Two developments are particularly
revealing.
First, the ICC had difficulty making its orders effective. Lacking the
power to compel obedience to its orders, the agency was required to
seek judicial enforcement of its mandates when railroad companies
8
ignored adverse directives. This step, of course, created opportunities
for delay when carriers disobeyed the ICC. More troublesome,
however, was that federal courts from the outset refused to defer to
agency findings of fact. Instead, the federal courts decided that factual
matters should be reviewed de novo, and permitted the introduction of
9
further evidence by either party. The findings by the ICC were treated
10
as a sort of preliminary report. In ICC v. Alabama Midland Railway,
the Supreme Court affirmed this practice, ruling that the lower courts
should give effect “to the findings of fact in the report of the
11
Commission as prima facie evidence of the matters therein stated.” It
added that the courts “are not restricted to the evidence adduced before
the Commission, [but] additional evidence may be put in by either party,

7. MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH
CENTURY AMERICA 428 (1977).
8. See Interstate Commerce Act § 16, 24 Stat. at 384–85.
9. See ELY, supra note 2, at 93; Kentucky & I. Bridge Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 37 F.
567, 614 (C.C.D. Ky. 1889) (first judicial test of an ICC order).
10. 168 U.S. 144 (1897).
11. Id. at 175.
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and . . . the duty of the court is to decide, as a court of equity, upon the
12
entire body of evidence.”
Second, the ICC had difficulty establishing just and reasonable rates.
The regulation of railroad rates was one of the most vexing, contested,
and misunderstood issues facing lawmakers in the late nineteenth
century. As common carriers, railroads had long been under an
obligation to charge reasonable and nondiscriminatory prices. But the
common law also allowed the carriers considerable latitude in setting
rates. In the 1870s some states enacted so-called Granger laws, which
13
empowered state commissions to prescribe maximum charges.
Congress, however, stopped short of giving the ICC such authority.
Under the 1887 Act, the agency could review rates and set aside those
deemed unreasonable, but not fix rates. In time, however, the ICC
asserted that the power to impose rates should be implied from the
power to bar unreasonable rates.
14
In ICC v. Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway, the
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice David Brewer, rejected this
15
contention. It determined that, subject to the requirement that charges
be reasonable and not discriminatory, the Interstate Commerce Act left
16
the carriers free to adjust their rates to meet business conditions. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court stressed the heavy investment in
railroads and that rail transportation was carried on under diverse
17
Pointing out that
conditions in different parts of the country.
administrative regulation of railroads was not new, the Court compared
the language of the Act with that of state regulatory measures. A
number of state laws clearly granted railroad commissions the power to
fix rates, but such authority was not expressly given by Congress to the
ICC. The authority to prescribe rates, the Court insisted, was “a power
of supreme delicacy and importance,” and could not be implied from
18
“doubtful or uncertain” language. The Court disapproved of what it
saw as an agency grab for power. The justices observed that “it would
be strange if an administrative body could by any mere process of
construction create for itself a power which Congress had not given to
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
See ELY, supra note 2, at 86–87.
167 U.S. 479 (1897).
Id. at 493.
Id.
Id. at 494.
Id. at 505.
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it.”19 The Court left open, however, the possibility that Congress might
confer ratemaking power on the ICC. Until that happened with the
20
Hepburn Act of 1906, the ICC was compelled to abandon its efforts to
set rates for the carriers.
By the early twentieth century, the ICC was largely toothless and
spent much of its energy gathering statistics about the rail industry. In
1903 the ICC explained: “At present this Commission can investigate
and report. It has no power to determine what rate is reasonable, and
21
such orders as it can make have no binding effect.” Nonetheless, the
ICC served a vital political purpose. It satisfied the popular clamor for
governmental control of railroads, even if the supervision was largely
22
nominal.
Although the Interstate Commerce Act was important as the
prototype for subsequent regulatory measures by Congress, the early
history of the Act is a study in unresolved problems. Clearly the federal
courts were dubious about an administrative body that was an uncertain
fit in the constitutional system as traditionally understood. The modern
norm of a deferential attitude toward administrative bodies was not the
prevailing judicial view in the late nineteenth century. Indeed, implicit
in the Supreme Court decisions narrowly construing the authority of the
ICC was the premise that Congress, not the Commission, was the proper
policymaking body. The Supreme Court of the 1890s was disposed
toward private economic ordering, but the responsibility for the feeble
power of the ICC rests ultimately with Congress, not the Court. It is far
from clear that Congress was very serious about regulating the carriers.
Revealingly, Congress appeared untroubled about Court rulings adverse
to the ICC, and made no move to strengthen the agency for years. In
fact, the ICC remained passive for a decade after the 1897 decisions.

19. Id. at 510.
20. Ch. 3591, § 4, 34 Stat. 584, 589–90 (1906) (amending section 15 of the 1887 Act).
21. 17 ICC ANN. REP. 17 (1903).
22. Cf. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 339 (3d ed. 2005)
(“Congress was only half-serious about taming the railroads; it was in deadly earnest only
about public opinion.”).

